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WHO KILLED ARTICLE 38(1)(B)? A REPLY TO 
BRADLEY & GULATI 
ANTHEA ROBERTS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati’s provocative article, Withdrawing 
from International Custom,1 shines light on a central yet under-analyzed 
issue about customary international law and brings to bear thought-
provoking research and analysis. Ultimately, however, when one considers 
custom’s nature and purpose, the withdrawal proposal is unpersuasive as a 
matter of theory and limited as a matter of practice. 
First, the withdrawal proposal is premised on an analogy between 
treaties and custom given the apparent anomaly that withdrawal is 
sometimes permitted from the former but never from the latter. Yet the 
emphasis in treaty law is on optional commitments entered into 
individually by states, whereas custom sets the ground rules for the 
international system by imposing a minimum core of binding obligations 
on all states. Treaties might commonly permit exit precisely because 
custom, which does not allow for withdrawal, exists to protect key 
structural and substantive interests. If so, the suggestion that states should 
be able to withdraw from custom because they can withdraw from treaties 
is flawed. Treaties and custom serve different purposes, so it is 
unsurprising that they have complementary rather than analogous 
secondary rules. 
Second, the potential exceptions to a right of withdrawal appear to be 
so extensive as to largely swallow the rule. Ignoring the presumption in 
treaty law that withdrawal is prohibited unless it is expressly or impliedly 
permitted, the authors fail to state a positive case for when withdrawal 
would be appropriate and give but a single hypothetical to illustrate their 
theory in practice. Instead, sensitive to some of the problems of permitting 
withdrawal from key customary norms, Bradley and Gulati carefully craft 
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numerous exceptions to and limitations on their proposal. Not only do these 
exceptions appear to be somewhat ad hoc, but their breadth undermines the 
boldness of the withdrawal proposal, exposing its negligible effects in 
practice. 
Third, the withdrawal proposal may be very interesting within the 
confines of academia, but seems hazardous when appreciated in its real 
world context. The authors seem intent on considering their proposal within 
the controlled environment of the academic laboratory, seeking to identify 
the ideal rule and best possible exceptions. But concern arises when their 
proposal is transported into the real world because the authors cannot 
ensure that states will accept their headline claim—a right of withdrawal—
subject to all of the constraints they deem necessary to make their proposal 
palatable. Despite this, Bradley and Gulati do not account for the costs of 
introducing uncertainty about custom’s secondary rules, nor do they 
sufficiently consider the ways in which their proposal is likely to facilitate 
opportunistic and abusive claims. 
Finally, allowing states to withdraw from custom might stunt custom’s 
development and shift power from the majority of states to individual 
states. Drawing on the concepts of exit and voice developed by Albert 
Hirschman,2 this Article suggests that allowing states to withdraw from 
customs (exit) might lessen their incentive to argue for changes to those 
customs (voice), which could inhibit the dynamics of change in customary 
international law. In addition, changes in customary law obligations would 
come not from the actions and reactions of states as a whole but from a 
single state’s decision to unilaterally withdraw. The resulting shift in power 
from the majority of states to individual states is problematic given 
custom’s function of protecting key structural and substantive norms in 
order to best serve the interests of the international community. 
Bradley and Gulati’s withdrawal proposal is certainly novel. Although 
a strength in the academy, this novelty begs the question of why the authors 
can cite to no examples of states arguing for a right of withdrawal. Novelty 
can be a strength where authors have seen a truth that others have missed, 
but it can also be a weakness where authors have missed a truth that others 
have seen or assumed. I believe that the lack of agitation by states for a 
right of withdrawal reflects a general recognition by them that they have a 
collective interest in having certain norms determined by a collective 
process, without the possibility of individual withdrawal. In light of this 
interest, I hope that any concerns raised about the death of or serious injury 
 
 2. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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to Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute as a result of Bradley and Gulati’s 
withdrawal proposal will come to be seen as greatly exaggerated.3 
I. ON FALSE ANALOGIES 
Central to the Bradley and Gulati article is an analogy between the 
secondary rules for treaties and customary international law. The article 
begins by contrasting treaties and custom: treaties are expressly negotiated, 
usually written down, subject to domestic ratification and generally provide 
for the right of individual states to withdraw; custom, by contrast, is not 
expressly negotiated, is often unwritten, does not require domestic 
ratification and permits persistent objection but not subsequent 
withdrawal.4 “It is not obvious,” the authors argue, “why it should be easier 
to exit from treaties than from [custom], especially given the significant 
regulatory overlap that exists today between treaties and [custom]” and that 
“modern claims about the content of [custom] often rely heavily on the 
content of treaties, especially multilateral treaties, even though many of 
these same treaties contain withdrawal clauses.”5 
As treaties and custom often cover similar subject matter, and treaties 
frequently evidence custom, the authors assume that the sources’ secondary 
rules should be analogous. But analogical reasoning works well only if two 
situations are “relevantly similar” and there are not “relevant differences” 
between them.6 Despite the centrality of the analogy to their argument, 
Bradley and Gulati only briefly (and belatedly) question whether 
differences between treaties and custom justify divergent rules.7 In doing 
so, they avert to the fact that states withdrawing from treaties remain bound 
by custom, leading to the concern that, if states could also withdraw from 
custom, gaps might appear in the law.8 Yet they respond by noting that 
international law is not a seamless web of rules and, in any event, such 
gaps might encourage treaty negotiations and would otherwise be subject to 
the Lotus principle of freedom of action.9 
By failing to recognize relevant differences between the function of 
 
 3. With apologies to Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms 
Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (1970) and Louis Henkin, The Reports of 
the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 544, 544 (1971). 
 4. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 204. 
 5. Id. at 205. 
 6. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 745 (1993); see also 
Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 933 (1996). 
 7. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 270-73. 
 8. Id. at 272. 
 9. Id. at 272-73. 
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treaties and custom, and the potential synergy between these sources, 
Bradley and Gulati overlook explanations that account for these sources’ 
divergent secondary rules. Treaties may well commonly permit exit 
precisely because custom, which does not allow for withdrawal, exists to 
protect key interests. If so, one cannot suggest that states should be able to 
withdraw from custom because they can do so from treaties as this 
argument fails to take into account the effect of the presumed safety net 
provided by custom. If treaties and custom had equivalent secondary rules, 
there would be little utility in having both sources. Instead, the sources’ 
secondary rules complement, rather than mirror, each other. Treaties enable 
states to enter into—and sometimes withdraw from—new or different 
international obligations on both an optional and individual basis. But this 
patchwork of obligations is made workable by a minimum core of 
generally applicable customary norms that exist to protect key substantive 
and structural interests of the international community. 
In some areas, custom exists in the absence of universal treaties (e.g., 
jurisdiction, statehood and state responsibility). In other areas, custom 
exists alongside treaties that may be universally ratified, widely ratified, 
sparsely ratified and/or pockmarked by reservations (e.g., the use of force, 
diplomatic and state immunities, the law of treaties, international 
humanitarian law and human rights). Some norms are extended from 
custom to treaty and others from treaty to custom. To understand why, it is 
helpful to consider the concept of legalization, which defines international 
commitments by reference to three characteristics: obligation (whether or 
not a commitment is binding); precision (where the legal commitment falls 
on the spectrum between specific rules and general standards); and 
delegation (whether a third party, like a court or tribunal, has been granted 
authority to interpret and apply the law).10 
Custom typically involves high levels of obligation but low levels of 
precision and delegation. (With the exception of jus cogens norms, which 
are always obligatory, states can contract out of custom by treaty or 
regional custom or through persistent objection, but the former two require 
the consent of other interested states and the latter is rarely utilized.) Where 
the custom precedes the treaty, the latter may have the advantage of 
increasing precision or delegating enforcement, but it does not undermine 
the obligatory nature of custom. Where the treaty precedes the custom, the 
 
 10. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000). See 
also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992) 
(expanding the distinction between rules and standards); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–89 (1976) (distinguishing between “formally 
realizable” rules and standards defined by underlying “substantive objectives”). 
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movement to custom often reflects recognition of, or a desire to recognize, 
the core commitments as non-revocable and binding on all states, thereby 
increasing their obligatory nature or scope. For example, the push to 
recognize a customary prohibition on apartheid seemed motivated by a 
desire to bind apartheid South Africa.11 
When treaties do not overlap with customary law obligations, it is 
unsurprising that states may withdraw from those treaties because such 
commitments are optional in the first place and thus, subject to reliance 
interests and corresponding notice requirements, should usually be 
revocable. But what about when treaties overlap with custom? Regarding 
such treaties, some say nothing about withdrawal,12 others expressly permit 
withdrawal without mentioning custom,13 and others allow withdrawal but 
explicitly note that states remain bound by their customary law 
obligations.14 In each case, however, the background assumption is that 
states remain bound by custom.15 One cannot reason that because 
withdrawal is permitted from treaties in particular areas, it should also be 
permitted from equivalent customary norms, as this reasoning fails to take 
account of the effect of the presumed safety net provided by customary 
international law. 
Take the Genocide Convention, for example, which prohibits treaty 
parties from committing genocide, gives the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) jurisdiction over claims relating to its interpretation and/or 
 
 11. See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent 
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 479 (1985); see also Holning Lau, Comment, 
Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495 
(2006) (making a similar point about human rights norms in general). 
 12. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95. 
 13. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. XIV, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
 14. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 63, ¶ 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 68 (Denunciations 
“shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill by 
virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”); Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
art. 63, ¶ 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (same); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 142, ¶ 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (same); 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 158, ¶ 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (same). 
 15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 43, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT] (stating that withdrawal from a treaty “shall not in any way impair the 
duty of any State to fulfil any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under 
international law independently of the treaty”). 
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application, and explicitly permits withdrawal under certain conditions.16 
One could not assume (and the authors do not assume) that similar 
withdrawal rights should therefore be permitted under custom because the 
treaty and customary norms cover similar substantive terrain and the treaty 
is often cited as evidence of the custom. A treaty party that withdraws from 
the Convention remains bound by the substantive prohibition on genocide, 
both as a matter of custom and because of its jus cogens status, but will no 
longer be bound by its non-customary law obligations, such as consent to 
ICJ jurisdiction. It may be that it is this very customary law safety net that 
makes withdrawal from the treaty acceptable (or, at least, less 
objectionable). 
The analogy between treaties and custom betrays an implicit 
commitment to viewing international law through a contract law lens. As 
with contracts, states can individually determine whether or not to enter 
into treaties and, subject to their terms, may also withdraw from those 
commitments. The emphasis is on optional obligations and individual 
consent. But custom is developed and changed by collective actions and 
generally imposes mandatory obligations to protect common community 
interests. The analogy here might be closer to the compulsory application 
of criminal law or mandatory public regulation. No one finds it strange that 
individuals cannot unilaterally withdraw from criminal law obligations 
(such as the prohibition on murder) or rules designed to facilitate societal 
interactions (such as road rules and immigration laws). The secondary rules 
in these areas of law diverge from those in contract law because they serve 
different purposes. 
There might, in fact, be a stronger analogy between custom and social 
contract theory, than between custom and contract. In domestic law, the 
notion of a social contract captures the idea that legitimate state authority 
must be based on the consent of the governed. Individuals give general or 
theoretical consent to limit their rights in order to create a fair and workable 
set of rules governing all of them in a society.17 Individuals cannot 
unilaterally withdraw from these rules, but they can work collectively or by 
majority to change them. By analogy, consent in custom is not given by 
individual states to individual rules; rather states consent collectively to 
generally binding rules in recognition that certain substantive and structural 
 
 16. Genocide Convention, supra note 13, at arts. I, IX, XIV. 
 17. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Dent 1983) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. 
Press 2003) (1690); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS (Donald A. Kress ed., trans., Hackett 1987) (1750-1762). 
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rules are needed to create an orderly and just international community.18 
Custom protects collective interests while treaties prize individual 
autonomy, so it is unsurprising that the sources’ secondary rules are 
complementary rather than analogous. 
II. OF BOLD CLAIMS AND LIMITED EFFECTS 
The idea that certain community interests should prevail over the right 
of individual states to withdraw from custom is not inimical to Bradley and 
Gulati’s theory. Sensitive to the need to protect some norms from being 
entirely optional, the authors identify numerous potential limitations on a 
right of withdrawal, including: an exception for highly normative customs, 
such as jus cogens norms; limitations where exiting would impose costs on 
other states, such as with the prohibition on war; and possible exceptions 
for human rights norms on account of “significant agency problems” and 
“certain structural or background principles” such as pacta sunt servanda.19 
But this patchwork quilt of exceptions raises a number of concerns. 
First, it is not clear that one should start with the presumption that 
withdrawal from custom is generally permitted and then look for 
exceptions to that general rule. If one takes the treaty analogy seriously, it 
would support the opposite presumption. Absent a specific term to the 
contrary, withdrawal from a treaty is not permitted unless “the parties 
intended to admit the possibility of denunciation” or such a right “may be 
implied by the nature of the treaty.”20 If the same presumption applied to 
custom, Bradley and Gulati would need to provide a positive case for when 
a right of withdrawal was intended or could be implied from the custom’s 
nature.21 Yet the authors ignore this aspect of the treaty analogy and make 
 
 18. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law—Governance, Democracy and 
Legitimacy, 64 ZAÖRV 547, 556 (2004) (the goals of modern international law “often transcend any 
[specific] transactional interest and are of a ‘meta’ type – i.e. the overall interest in having an orderly or 
just international community” thus making analogies with contracts unconvincing); Bruno Simma & 
Andreas L. Paulus, The “International Community”: Facing the Challenge of Globalization, 9 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 266, 266 (1998) (noting that the idea of an “international community” prioritizes community 
interests over the egoistic interests of individual states, leading to a departure from the classical Lotus 
principle towards a more communitarian approach to international law); Bruno Simma, From 
Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 217, 229-235 (1994) 
(tracing the movement from traditional bilateral approaches to international law founded on a “delict-
property-contract ethos” to a modern, more multilateral approach that emphasizes certain community 
interests of states and non-state actors as a whole over the views and consent of individual states) (citing 
Philip Allott, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 324 (1990)). 
 19. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 263-68, 273-74. 
 20. VCLT, supra note 15, at art. 56. 
 21. There were suggestions in the VCLT’s drafting history that implied withdrawal might not be 
possible for codifying or law-making treaties, though no firm conclusion was reached partly because of 
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no such positive case. 
Second, the exceptions give the impression of being ad hoc rather than 
coherent. It may have been helpful for the authors to ground their 
exceptions in related principles, such as limitations on the permissibility of 
countermeasures. Countermeasures arguably reflect a narrow right to 
withdraw from certain international obligations in specific circumstances. 
Although the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international 
obligation is precluded if and to the extent that it amounts to a 
countermeasure, various limitations apply, including that such measures 
cannot affect obligations: to refrain from using force; for the protection of 
fundamental human rights; of a humanitarian character prohibiting 
reprisals; or that amount to peremptory norms.22 Tapping into these debates 
may have provided a fruitful basis for grounding some of the exceptions 
that Bradley and Gulati propose, whilst also highlighting how controversial 
and problematic even a narrow right of withdrawal has proved. 
Third, it is unclear how far the potential exceptions to a withdrawal 
right extend. As the authors do not positively identify which customs 
would be subject to withdrawal, assessing the practical impact of their 
theory is difficult. If the restrictions are limited, we may end up with states 
being able to unilaterally opt out of important substantive and structural 
norms, despite potential detriment to specific states and non-state actors or 
to the international system as a whole. If they are expansive, the bold 
theoretical claim that states should be able to presumptively withdraw from 
custom might be so circumscribed in practice as to have little effect. Given 
the nature of customary norms, which exist on a spectrum between more 
normative and more facilitative rules,23 I suspect that any exceptions to a 
 
the complicating factor that states remain bound by the underlying customary rules in any event. Report 
of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 250-51, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. The International Law Commission suggested 
that peace and boundary treaties do not permit implied withdrawal, whereas treaties of alliance do, id., 
but it is hard to find a clear rationale that could be applied to all treaties. Aust distinguishes territory, 
codification, peace and disarmament, permanent regimes (like the Suez Canal) and human rights 
treaties which do not permit implied withdrawal, from alliance, commercial, trading, cultural relations, 
dispute resolution and international organization constituent treaties which do; suggesting that implied 
withdrawal is more likely when there is no presumption of a customary obligation (e.g., dispute 
resolution clauses given the presumption that international jurisdiction is consensual) and less likely 
when dealing with highly normative issues (like human rights) or interests that cannot be protected 
through the provision of mere notice (like boundary treaties). ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW 
AND PRACTICE 290-91 (2007). 
 22. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR 
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, arts. 22, 49-54 (James Crawford, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2002) (2001) [hereinafter ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY] 
 23. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 758, 764-66 (2001). 
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right of withdrawal would end up largely swallowing the rule. 
At one end of the spectrum, some customs deal with highly normative 
commitments, such as human rights norms, restrictions on the use of force, 
and humanitarian law obligations. The international community has a 
strong interest in these norms existing and having a particular content, 
regardless of the individual interests of particular states. Some of these 
normative customs are classified as jus cogens, such as the prohibition on 
genocide and the use of force, meaning that states accept that the 
normativity of these rules outweighs the right of any state to unilaterally 
dissent from them. Others are not categorized as jus cogens, yet unilateral 
withdrawal would be problematic because the rules implicate core interests 
of other states or non-state actors. These customs include certain human 
rights protections, limitations on lawful uses of force (such as necessity and 
proportionality), and key humanitarian law principles (including the 
principles of distinction and proportionality and the prohibition on causing 
unnecessary suffering).24 
At the other end of the spectrum, some customs help to facilitate 
interstate interaction by establishing structural constraints that permit states 
to coordinate and cooperate. These customs often work to minimize 
international friction by balancing competing interests of states, but 
generally lack the strongly normative quality of the customs outlined 
above. Examples include customary norms governing the law of treaties 
(e.g., who may sign a treaty, when a state can withdraw from a treaty and 
the requirement to abide by treaty commitments in good faith (pacta sunt 
servanda)), state responsibility (e.g., when a state will be responsible for 
the actions of its organs, sub-units, officials and non-state actors), and 
jurisdiction and immunities (e.g., when a state can assert jurisdiction 
extraterritorially or claim immunity before a foreign court). As these rules 
balance opposing interests, there is often room for debate about the precise 
trade off that should be made and their content may change over time. But, 
regardless of their exact content, states benefit from having generally 
applicable and relatively stable rules to structure and manage their 
interactions and competing interests. 
In the case of both normative and facilitative customs, the acting state 
is not the only one with an interest in these customary norms. In some 
 
 24. These norms largely overlap with those that cannot be affected by countermeasures. See 
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, at art 50. See also Silvia Borelli & Simon Olleson, 
Obligations Relating to Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 1177, 1177 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010) (explaining 
that these limitations on countermeasures seem motivated by the laws of humanity and the dictates of 
the public conscience). 
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cases, other states or non-state actors have specific interests that cannot be 
protected through mere notice. Civilians will not feel satisfied that they are 
now the subject of legitimate attack simply because a state has given notice 
that it no longer considers itself bound by the rule on distinction. Nor will 
one state feel appeased that another is exercising jurisdiction over matters 
within the first state’s territory simply because the latter gave notice that it 
no longer considered itself bound by the customary norms on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In other cases, states have a general interest in 
having universal rules in order to structure their basic interactions and 
reduce transaction costs. Allowing states to depart from foundational rules, 
like pacta sunt servanda, would cause significant headaches for 
international interaction even if notice were given. Likewise, permitting 
withdrawal from structural rules, such as a federal state being bound by the 
actions of its component units, would increase uncertainty and transaction 
costs. 
To the extent that Bradley and Gulati note that the mandatory 
approach to custom may have solidified overtime, this should not be 
surprising given both the increased number of states (making patchwork 
rules on core structural or interactional issues more cumbersome and 
costly) and the more normative content of international law post-World 
War II (which now encompasses commitments like human rights 
obligations). Waiting for treaty solutions to cover potential gaps left by 
withdrawal may be problematic where negotiations are protracted and/or 
individual states have incentives to hold out on rules that are in the general 
interest of the international community. And resorting to the Lotus 
presumption of freedom of action in these areas would be unsatisfactory 
where one state’s actions are likely to infringe on the interests of other 
states and non-state actors. This may explain why international courts have 
shied away from relying on the Lotus principle to resolve disputes in 
controversial areas.25 
Of course, Bradley and Gulati might well object that each of these 
customs would be protected from withdrawal by one of their many 
exceptions or that, even if exit were permitted, states would lack the 
incentive to withdraw. But, if so, to what does their theory really apply? 
Other than a hypothetical about the diplomatic pouch, their article is largely 
bereft of examples of customs to which their controversial theory might 
apply. I believe that both this illustration and the absence of other examples 
speak volumes about the limited nature of their theory. 
 
 25. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (failing 
to discuss or apply the Lotus principle). 
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The diplomatic pouch example is illuminating because it involves a 
balance between the interests of the sending and receiving state, rather than 
between a state and an individual or the international community. 
Reasonable disagreements may exist over whether a customary rule should 
prohibit or permit screening of diplomatic pouches, which contrasts with 
more normative customs where the international community has a clear 
interest in the rule having a particular content (as, for example, with 
genocide and the principle of proportionality). Tit-for-tat responses would 
not be unreasonable in this area, in contrast to other areas where equal but 
opposite retaliation would be objectionable (as, for example, with human 
rights norms). And the provision of notice would allow other states to 
modify their behavior in order to lessen any harm caused by the screening, 
which may not be possible in other areas (for example, it is difficult to see 
how one state could modify its behavior to lessen the harm of objectionable 
exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction in its territory by another state). 
The absence of other examples is even more illuminating. Bradley and 
Gulati suggest that their article sets out a general theory and that the next 
step is to develop a typology of customs to which it applies.26 But not 
applying their proposal in the current article works to obscure something 
important about their theory. Underlying the limitations and exceptions 
they espouse seems to be a thesis that withdrawal from customary norms is 
not problematic, subject to adequate notice being given, where exiting 
effectively causes no injury.27 But if customs usually exist in order to 
protect the interests of other states or non-state actors individually, or of the 
international community collectively, this “no injury” requirement might be 
the exception that swallows their rule. Subject to jus cogens norms, we 
already permit states to opt out of custom through treaty or regional 
practices where other affected states consent. What, if anything, is left 
between customs where other affected states would not consent to one state 
opting out and customs where a state should be able to unilaterally 
withdraw because doing so would cause no injury?28 
III. OUT OF THE LABORATORY 
It is interesting how Bradley and Gulati characterize the aim of their 
paper. They describe their goal as not to challenge custom’s legitimacy but 
 
 26. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 273. 
 27. See id. 
 28. To the extent that one could identify customary norms that would be appropriate for a 
withdrawal right, I would support the application of many of the limitations identified by the authors 
and Laurence Helfer. See id. at 258-59, 273-75; Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Custom: Analogies to 
Treaty Withdrawals, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 65 (2010). 
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to “better understand” how it does and should operate.29 Consistent with 
that goal, they claim to be writing “primarily for scholars and students of 
international law,” with the aim of initiating an “academic discourse” about 
whether the default view of custom might be more appropriate in certain 
circumstances and about what subject matter limits and notice requirements 
would ideally apply.30 In doing so, they seem to be self-consciously 
attempting to confine their project to the academy, with no apparent 
ambition to speak to states or influence state practice. And they see their 
role as being to identify the ideal rule and best possible limitations and 
exceptions in laboratory-like academic conditions. 
Yet disquiet arises when their withdrawal idea is transported from the 
laboratory to the real world. Academics cannot define and delimit their 
audience. The opinions of academics can play an important role in shaping 
international law—a point that Bradley and Gulati clearly recognize in their 
historical review of the rules governing custom. Given the potential 
influence of academic work on international law’s development, the 
authors’ attempts to cabin their article to the academy seem naïve. This also 
means that proposals about custom should not be assessed in a controlled 
laboratory environment where one can package certain options together and 
control for variables. Any theory of custom should be assessed in light of 
the fact that states are likely to use it to make conflicting and sometimes 
opportunistic arguments. When assessed in this light, two concerns become 
apparent. 
First, the withdrawal proposal increases uncertainty about custom’s 
secondary rules. The choice is not between all states accepting the 
mandatory view or all states endorsing the default view. Introducing the 
option may well encourage states to split between these positions, creating 
uncertainty over the secondary rules governing an already uncertain source. 
The authors examine the efficiency of each view in isolation, but do not 
assess the inefficiency or costs of having uncertainty over the secondary 
rules governing custom, which is the likely result of presenting this choice. 
These are not mere transition costs as states move from one approach to the 
other; the real risk here is in putting custom in limbo between these two 
approaches for a long or indefinite period. Certainly, the risk of introducing 
or increasing uncertainty occurs whenever someone questions secondary 
rules. This does not mean that such proposals should not be raised; rather, 
the cost of such uncertainty must be weighed against the proposal’s 
benefits. 
 
 29. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 275; see also 208. 
 30. Id. at 208, 275. 
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Second, suggesting a withdrawal right might increase the prospect of 
opportunistic or abusive claims by unscrupulous states. Outside of the 
academic lab, one cannot guarantee that states will adopt the headline claim 
(a withdrawal right) with all of the exceptions and limitations that the 
authors deem wise. What if some states endorse the default view but assert 
that it is applicable across the board, even with respect to core substantive 
norms and important structural constraints? It will be difficult to discipline 
such approaches by appeals to state practice as such practice neither 
motivates the overall withdrawal proposal nor the exceptions identified. 
Yet Bradley and Gulati assess the functionality of their ideal rule only, 
rather than also considering the utility of their rule if the limitations they 
deem necessary to make it palatable are not adopted in whole or in part. 
Uncertainty about custom’s secondary rules might facilitate abusive 
claims about custom’s (in)applicability. Utilizing the concept of 
legalization, custom is currently understood as obligatory, imprecise, and 
not generally subject to delegation.31 Accordingly, most debates about 
custom occur over its existence and content, not its binding nature. Under 
the withdrawal proposal, however, states would also be allowed to exit 
from custom, making it optional rather than obligatory. This shift would 
soften custom’s legalization, moving it along the law-to-politics spectrum 
and increasing state discretion. This approach would open up new avenues 
for uncertainty and canny argumentation as states could dispute whether a 
custom binds them and whether they gave adequate notice of withdrawal, 
in addition to contesting the custom’s existence and content.32 
The question here may be, in part, one of intention versus effect. Are 
Bradley and Gulati crafting a Machiavellian approach to custom in order to 
assist unprincipled governments in extricating themselves from important 
customary law requirements? No. But is their approach open to this sort of 
opportunism, with states endorsing the idea of withdrawal without 
 
 31. As noted above, the obligatory nature of custom is subject to the rarely utilized persistent 
objector doctrine and the possibility of states opting out through treaty or regional custom with the 
consent of other affected states. 
 32. The case for, and risks posed by, withdrawal may be different where enforcement is delegated 
to international courts and tribunals. Demand for withdrawal might be greater because the combination 
of high obligation and delegation, coupled with low precision, shifts interpretive discretion from states 
to courts. See Abbott et al., supra note 10, at 415; Robert O. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute 
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 461–62 (2000). However, the risk of 
abuse might also be lower as courts could police withdrawal claims. Cf. Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 419-20 (Nov. 26) (enforcing 
notice period requirements on withdrawal and suggesting that a reasonable notice period would always 
be required). The possibility of delegation might encourage some states to opt for the default view of 
custom. But, as delegation is haphazard at best, this approach may pave the way for increased 
uncertainty and abuse in custom more generally where delegation is not present. 
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accepting or following the subject matter or notice limitations they 
propose? Yes, and this is worrying. As much as the authors want to treat 
the notion of withdrawal as a purely academic exercise, custom exists in 
the real world. The utility of assessing the functionality of the mandatory 
view and the default view as idealized types existing in a vacuum is 
questionable when suggesting withdrawal rights is likely to result in murky, 
middle ground positions. 
I am not suggesting that Bradley and Gulati should not have written 
this article; there is merit in academics pushing the boundaries of analysis 
and a discipline is only as strong as its ability to respond to critiques. But 
assessing proposals in a vacuum is problematic because it neglects real 
world costs that become evident when proposals are understood in their 
true context. 
IV. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE 
Bradley and Gulati’s suggestion that withdrawal rights might help in 
custom’s formation and change is also unconvincing. To explain why, let 
us consider Hirschman’s concepts of exit and voice as two mechanisms by 
which members can respond to declines in benefits provided by 
organizations and institutions.33 As Joseph Weiler, who applied 
Hirschman’s theory in the context of the European Community, explains: 
“Exit is the mechanism of organizational abandonment in the face of 
unsatisfactory performance. Voice is the mechanism of intraorganizational 
correction and recuperation.”34 
In our context, exit might be understood as the equivalent of a state 
withdrawing from a custom, while voice may represent attempts by a state 
to change or influence the existence, interpretation or application of a 
custom by which it is bound. Voice options include arguments to the effect 
that X custom does or does not exist, X custom exists but should be 
interpreted in Y way, and X custom exists but does not apply in Z 
circumstances. The exit option would be akin to saying that, even if X 
custom exists, it does not bind the relevant state. 
In addition to identifying the mechanisms of exit and voice, 
Hirschman and Weiler posit a particular dynamism between the two: “a 
stronger ‘outlet’ for Voice reduces pressure on the Exit option and can lead 
to more sophisticated processes of self-correction. By contrast, the closure 
of Exit leads to demands for enhanced Voice.”35 The mandatory view, 
 
 33. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 2. 
 34. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2411 (1991). 
 35. Id. at 2412. 
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which permits voice but not exit once a custom is established, replicates 
this approach. At the same time, calls for increased voice may be less 
effective in the absence of a credible threat of exit.36 This option is 
reflected in the default view because states have exit and voice options. 
How might these different approaches affect the development and 
change of customary norms? In theory, custom is built on the back of 
widespread and consistent state practice and opinio juris. In practice, it is 
often made and changed on the back of the actions and statements of a 
smaller number of states (often together with actions/statements of other 
actors, such as international courts) coupled with general acquiescence by 
the majority. Under the mandatory view, if states are dissatisfied with an 
existing custom, they can voice their disagreement with it and, in doing so, 
seek to change the custom. But if states regularly opt to exit custom 
instead, this might lead to stagnation in custom’s development because 
states would not seek to change its general content but rather its specific 
application to a given state. The role of acquiescence here is key. Under the 
voice model, a minority of states may be able to change the custom in the 
face of general acquiescence. Yet if those states simply exited, the general 
acquiescence might seem to remain in support of the original rather than 
modified rule. 
Two ways of dealing with this problem are immediately obvious. 
First, any attempt at exit could be treated as effectively being a dual voice 
and exit claim. This would involve recasting withdrawal attempts as 
amounting to a claim that X custom does not exist or should have a 
different content (voice) and, if not, that X custom does not apply to the 
particular state because of its withdrawal (exit). In this way, exit attempts 
would also impact custom’s development. Second, states might already 
have adequate incentives to adopt this dual approach. An analogy might be 
found in the use of exit and voice at custom’s formation through the 
persistent objector doctrine. Although we might expect states to favor the 
persistent objection argument as an easier option than shaping custom’s 
content, it seems much more common for a state to argue that X is not a 
customary norm, with the idea that X is a custom but the state is not bound 
by it being clearly a secondary argument.37 Thus states simultaneously 
exercise their options of voice and exit in that order.38 
 
 36. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 2, at 33–34, 82–86. 
 37. See Stein, supra note 11, at 457-63. 
 38. A good recent example can be found in reactions to the ICRC’s Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, which concluded that certain customary rules had formed and that the 
United States, United Kingdom and France were persistent objectors to those rules. In rejecting this 
conclusion, the United States argued that “the weight of the evidence . . . clearly indicates that these 
ROBERTS_FMT4.DOC 1/10/2011  9:52:59 AM 
188 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 21:173 
Yet even if these approaches are adopted, what impact will they have 
on custom’s development? As Hirschman notes, calls for increased voice 
may be made more effective by a credible threat of exit.39 But do states 
want custom to be highly consensual, such that states can argue for a new 
interpretation of custom, threaten to exit the custom if their proposal is not 
accepted, and follow through on that threat if need be? Or are states happy 
for custom to be less consensual, deriving it from consensus views and 
making it binding on all states subject to changes by consensus? Bradley 
and Gulati’s approach shifts power from the majority of states to individual 
states even though part of custom’s virtue is that it represents consensus 
views on core structural and substantive issues. 
Bradley and Gulati argue for symmetry between the difficulty of the 
formation and exit rules for custom, a symmetry they believe is lacking 
because custom is easily formed yet withdrawal is impossible.40 But having 
custom created by majority or consensus views, yet subject to individual 
withdrawal, would create an asymmetry that shifts power from the majority 
to the minority.41 Where treaties and custom overlap, some states already 
take an opt-in approach where they do not sign the treaty but say that it 
generally represents binding custom subject to certain exceptions. The 
withdrawal approach would give these states an additional ability to opt-out 
by them being able to exit even from rules agreed to be customary. Again, 
this shifts custom away from a consensus model to a pick-and-choose 
approach that favors the interests of individual states over those of the 
 
three States are not simply persistent objectors, but rather that the rule has not formed into a customary 
rule at all.” See John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 443, 457 (2007) (emphasis added). The United States specifically affirmed the 
existence of the persistent objector doctrine, but would have preferred its views to have prevented the 
formation of a custom rather than simply prevented the custom’s application to it. Id. at 457, n. 43 (“We 
note that the Study raises doubts about the continued validity of the ‘persistent objector’ doctrine. 
Study, Vol. I, p. xxxix. The U.S. Government believes that the doctrine remains valid.”). 
 39. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 2, at 33–34, 82–86. 
 40. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 243-44. 
 41. Symmetry exists with jus cogens rules as these can be modified only by the emergence of 
another jus cogens rule. VCLT, supra note 15, at art. 53 (“a peremptory norm of general international 
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character”). The position with respect to custom is less clear 
as there is disagreement about whether a custom stays in effect until there is consensus on a new custom 
or whether the consensus behind one custom can be lost without a consensus on a new custom 
emerging. The latter approach appears more accurate, which means that outdated customs cannot be 
maintained by a minority of holdout states, contrary to Bradley and Gulati’s analysis. Bradley & Gulati, 
supra note 1, at 243-44. If anything, this makes the rules of change for custom less demanding than 
those of formation. 
ROBERTS_FMT4.DOC 1/10/2011  9:52:59 AM 
2010] WHO KILLED ARTICLE 38(1)(B)? 189 
international community. 
Whether one prioritizes the interests of the international community, 
or gives primacy to the sovereignty of individual states, often reflects one’s 
underlying ideological commitments. Gabriella Blum traces the division 
between “universalists, who aspire for an interconnected ‘one world, one 
law’ international order, and unilateralists, who value independence, 
flexibility and freedom of action.”42 The former are more likely to make 
appeals to concepts like the international community and the latter to 
concerns about sovereignty and national interests.43 Yet, regardless of one’s 
ideological preferences, it is noteworthy that Bradley and Gulati cite no 
examples of states clamoring for a general withdrawal right in custom. We 
also see few states exercising the right of persistent objection, which is the 
equivalent of withdrawal before a custom is formed. Perhaps this suggests 
that states are by and large happier to have generally applicable customary 
rules, and to attempt to influence the existence and content of those rules, 
rather than to permit patchwork rules and gaps on core customary norms. 
Under presently accepted secondary rules, customary norms may 
change over time but the threshold for change is relatively high because the 
international community has a vested interest in the stable existence and/or 
particular content of these norms. And when change comes, it does so not 
unilaterally from the decision of one state to withdraw, but from the actions 
and reactions (including acquiescence) of states as a whole, which has the 
virtue of providing a safety-in-numbers community check on the narrow 
self-interest of individual states. It may be that it is simply in the long term 
interests of states to create secondary rules for custom that limit their 
ability to individually opt out of such norms when their short term interests 
might otherwise tempt them to do so. This would explain both the absence 
of a general right to withdraw from custom and the lack of protests about 
such an absence. 
CONCLUSION 
Bradley and Gulati note that the shift towards the mandatory view 
“may have occurred more in academic commentary than in state 
practice,”44 pointing to the role of academics such as Brownlie and 
Oppenheim in mainstreaming this view. Yet a similar critique could be 
 
 42. Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 324 (2008). 
 43. See, e.g., Dino Kritsiotis, Imagining the International Community, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 961 
(2002); Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, 79 
FOREIGN AFF. 9, 9 (2000). 
 44. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 231. 
ROBERTS_FMT4.DOC 1/10/2011  9:52:59 AM 
190 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 21:173 
made of their proposal. The authors do not appear to be responding to state 
concerns in making their claim; indeed, they point to no examples of states 
arguing that they should have the right to unilaterally opt out of custom. 
Nor do they claim to be writing to states. And, given all of the potential 
carve outs, Bradley and Gulati’s bold claim—that states should be able to 
withdraw from custom contrary to prevailing wisdom—might have 
surprisingly limited practical effects. 
Despite the genuine originality and considerable intellectual value of 
their article, its central treaty/contract analogy remains unconvincing 
because of the different functions of the two sources, while its potential 
impact is concerning given that it is likely to increase uncertainty about 
custom’s secondary rules and facilitate opportunistic claims. Custom exists 
to serve key interests of the international community and states consent to 
it at a more general, structural level than they do with treaties. Instead of 
collapsing the distinction between these sources by making their secondary 
rules converge, it is worth exploring their complementary functions as 
these seem to justify divergent secondary rules. 
There is no doubt that custom is a problematic source. Considerable 
disputes exist over the content of its primary norms and the nature of its 
secondary norms. Yet, through all of the attacks and criticisms, custom 
endures because it serves an important purpose of securing baseline 
structural and substantive norms for the international community, which 
cannot be guaranteed through the optional and individualized commitments 
provided by treaty law alone. Recognizing this function should lead states 
and academics to reject Bradley and Gulati’s withdrawal proposal as ill-
suited to customary law theory and not grounded in actual practice. 
 
 
